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The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of observing other’s
movements on subsequent performance in bottlenose dolphins. The imitative ability of
non-human animals has intrigued a number of researchers. So far, however, studies
in dolphins have been confined to intentional imitation concerned with the explicit
request to imitate other agents. In the absence of instruction to imitate, do dolphins
(un)intentionally replicate other’s movement features? To test this, dolphins were filmed
while reaching and touching a stimulus before and after observing another dolphin (i.e.,
model) performing the same action. All videos were reviewed and segmented in order
to extract the relevant movements. A marker was inserted post hoc via software on
the videos upon the anatomical landmark of interest (i.e., rostrum) and was tracked
throughout the time course of the movement sequence. The movement was analyzed
using an in-house software developed to perform two-dimensional (2D) post hoc
kinematic analysis. The results indicate that dolphins’ kinematics is sensitive to other’s
movement features. Movements performed for the “visuomotor priming” condition were
characterized by a kinematic pattern similar to that performed by the observed dolphin
(i.e., model). Addressing the issue of spontaneous imitation in bottlenose dolphins might
allow ascertaining whether the potential or impulse to produce an imitative action is
generated, not just when they intend to imitate, but whenever they watch another
conspecific’s behavior. In closing, this will clarify whether motor representational capacity
is a by-product of factors specific to humans or whether more general characteristics
such as processes of associative learning prompted by high level of encephalization
could help to explain the evolution of this ability.
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Introduction
The human capacity for imitation is well-known and is considered one of the hallmarks of human
cognition and culture (Meltzoff and Prinz, 2002). From infancy on, humans habitually copy
behaviors of every type across a variety of contexts (Meltzoff, 1996; Tomasello, 1999). For many
decades, those studying imitation in children and animals focused on intentional imitation because
it was thought that imitation must be controlled in order to play an important role in cognitive and
social development, and to mediate cultural inheritance (Heyes, 2010).
Given the central role of imitation in human cognitive evolution and development, it is perhaps
not surprising that a great amount of research has been devoted to ascertain whether this ability is
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shared among non-human animals (Galef, 1988; Fiorito and
Scotto, 1992; Whiten and Ham, 1992; Leggio et al., 2000; Byrne
and Bates, 2010).
A surprising aspect stemming from this body of work is that
the animal most similar to humans in imitative abilities may
not be found among our closest relatives, but rather among
cetaceans (Herman, 2002). For instance, bottlenose dolphins
(Tursiops truncatus) exhibit a prominent ability to copy motor
behaviors of conspecifics, humans, and other animals (Tayler
and Saayman, 1973; Bauer and Johnson, 1994; Herman, 2002;
Jaakkola et al., 2010). So far, imitation in dolphins has been
chiefly investigated in terms of explicit request to imitate (e.g.,
Herman, 1980; Herman et al., 1989; Marino, 2002; Kuczaj and
Highfill, 2005; Kuczaj and Walker, 2006). Rather, mimicry,
imitative behavior that is not intended (Stürmer et al., 2000) and
of which the imitator may be unaware (Chartrand and Bargh,
1999), has received little attention. Unintentional imitation
is a compatibility effect in which the speed and/or accuracy
of behavioral performance is modulated by the relationship
between the topographic features of an observed action and the
observer’s responses. In the absence of instruction to imitate,
movement observation facilitates execution of the observed
action. Such facilitation effects have been described in humans
as a decrease in reaction time and an increase in average velocity
when an observed and a subsequently executed hand action
matched (i.e., Visuomotor Priming; see Craighero et al., 1998;
Castiello et al., 2002; Edwards et al., 2003; Heyes et al., 2005).
It is generally agreed that unintentional imitation effects result
from a process in which action observation activates motor
representations that are ‘‘similar’’ to the action observed (Heyes,
2011). The interesting question is then: does unintentional
imitation depends on learned or genetically prespecified,
stimulus-response (S-R) connections? Single-unit recording
indicates that monkeys have mirror neurons in the premotor
cortex, that is, cells that fire during observation and execution
of the same action (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996).
Similarly, the areas of the human brain that are activated by
observation and execution of the same actions are sometimes
called the ‘‘mirror neuron system’’ (Gazzola and Keysers, 2009;
Kilner et al., 2009). Many developmental and comparative
psychologists have suggested that nonhuman primates show
‘‘mimicry’’ (Tomasello, 1996; Meltzoff and Moore, 1997) or
‘‘response facilitation’’ (Byrne and Russon, 1998) because of
simple, innate S-R links, and it is widely assumed that the
perception–action matching properties of ‘‘mirror neurons’’ are
present at birth (Ferrari et al., 2009). On the other hand, two
theoretical accounts explain unintentional imitation as a by-
product of learned associations between perceptual and motor
representations: the ideomotor theory of action control (Prinz,
2005; Massen and Prinz, 2009) and the associative sequence
learning model of imitation (Heyes et al., 2005; Catmur et al.,
2009). In this connection, the extent to which animals can
imitate might reflect representational capacity and is a matter
of considerable importance (Whiten, 1998; Suddendorf and
Whiten, 2001; Kuczaj and Yeater, 2006). This is one reason
why studying unintentional imitation in dolphins is particularly
significant. Conclusive evidence of unintentional imitation in a
species as phylo-genetically distant from primates as dolphins
would play a pivotal role in determining whether this motor
representational capacity is a by-product of factors specific
to primates or whether more general characteristics such as
processes of associative learning related to a high level of
encephalization could help to explain the evolution of this
ability.
To investigate this issue, here we adapted a classic visuomotor
priming paradigm. A dolphin ‘‘A’’ observed another dolphin
(i.e., model) performing a reach-to-touch (with the rostrum)
action towards a spherical object. Subsequently, the dolphin ‘‘A’’
performed the same action towards the same object. A control
condition in which the dolphin performed the same movement
in the absence of any motor priming was also included. On the
basis of previous human findings based on a similar paradigm
(e.g., Edwards et al., 2003; Pierno et al., 2008), we hypothesize
that if the trailing dolphin is facilitated when primed by a
dolphin model, then reach-to-touch movement should exhibit
a higher average velocity than when visuomotor priming does
not occur. Conversely, if no facilitation occurs, then primed and




Two adult bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus, S. and L.,
male and female, 20 and 21 years respectively) participated in the
study. They swam in a pool of a round shape (20 m in diameter;
capacity 1300 m3, surface 310 m2 and maximum depth of 5 m;
Figure 1). The experimental procedure for the dolphins was
approved by the committee for animal research of the University
of Padova and adhered to the Ethical Guidelines for the Conduct
of Research on Animals by Zoos and Aquariums issued by the
World Association of Zoos and Aquariums (WAZA).
Stimulus and Experimental Set Up
The stimulus was a plastic ball (diameter 20 cm) attached to a
pinnacle located to a fixed distance of 10 m from the starting
position (Figure 2). Both the dolphins participating in this
experiment had already familiarized and played with the plastic
ball attached to the pinnacle in previous years. We purposely
abstained from introducing a new stimulus in the pool area to
avoid possible learning effects.
Video Recording Technique
A total of 12 h of video footage was filmed during daylight
hours between 10.00 a.m. and 12.00 p.m. in the time period
between 27th of May and 7th of June, 2013. The video was
filmed ad libitum using a A GoPro camera Hero3 (Black Edition
Wi-Fi compatible) fastened to a rigid trampoline above the
plane of motion. This procedure was utilized to guarantee a
constant point of reference during movements taking place on
the plane perpendicular to the camera axis. A frame of reference
identifying X and Y axes as horizontal and vertical directions
was manually set by an operator. In order to calibrate the space
of interest, a plank of 324 cm with a perpendicular bar at the
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FIGURE 1 | Aerial view of the pool (20 m in diameter; capacity 1300 m3, surface 310 m2 and maximum depth of 5 m) and relative position of the target
stimulus, video camera and trainer’s platform.
distal end (length 78 cm) was placed on three fixed points along
the perimeter of the pool. A known length in the camera’s field
of view and in the same plane as the movement was used as a
measurement reference unit.
Procedure
The trainer stood at the border of the pool facing the dolphins.
Then by means of a fixed signal she asked one of the dolphins
(i.e., ‘‘A’’) to reach the stimulus and touch it with the rostrum
(Control condition; Figure 2). As soon as the stimulus was
touched the trainer called the dolphin back to the starting
position by using a whistle. Then the trainer asked another
dolphin (i.e., model) to reach towards, touch the stimulus and
then return to the starting position. Immediately after, the trainer
asked the dolphin ‘‘A’’ to perform again the reach-to-touch
action (Visuomotor Priming condition). The ‘‘model dolphin’’
was kept oriented toward the platform by the trainer during
performance of dolphin ‘‘A’’ to prevent it from observing its
movements. Nonetheless, to exclude the possibility that in some
trial ‘‘model’’ dolphin might be influenced by dolphin ‘‘A’’,
all its data were removed from the analysis. The alternating
sequence was repeated 10 times per daily session, with the
dolphin ‘‘A’’ always following the model (trials: 3, 5, 7, 9, 11)
except for the control condition (trial 1). Both dolphins acted
as models and experimental subjects, in randomized sessions
for 6 days. Notably, only one of them acted as experimental
FIGURE 2 | Schematic section of the pool and field of view of the video camera. The stimulus was a plastic ball (diameter 20 cm) attached to a pinnacle
located to a fixed distance of 10 m from the starting position.
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subject during each daily session, since only one of them could
perform the control condition (pre-observation of the model
dolphin).
Data Processing
Following data collection all videos were reviewed and segmented
in order to extract the relevant reach-to-touch movements.
For the ‘‘visuomotor priming’’ condition only movements in
which the dolphin ‘‘A’’ observed the model performing the
considered action before executing it were considered for
subsequent analysis. Two independent reviewers who were
unaware of the study rationale and blind to the experimental
conditions scored each segment. They analyzed the footage
frame-by-frame (frame duration: 20 ms) using an in-house
software developed to perform post hoc kinematical analysis.
Reliability between the two was quite high (Cohen’s κ = 0.86).
A marker was placed post hoc on each subject’s rostrum. The
starting position was defined as the water area frontal to the
trainer’s platform at the border of the pool (2 m2). Movement
onset was defined as the time at which the tangential velocity
of the marker crossed a threshold (5 mm/s) and remained
above it for longer than 500 ms. End of the movement was
defined as the time at which the rostrum touched the stimulus.
Movement tracking procedures were then performed in order to
extract the kinematic parameter of interest. The analysis focused
on the velocity profile to evaluate how the observer’s action
changed following the observation of a model’s movements
(Bisio et al., 2010). Average and Peak velocity, defined as
the maximum velocity value occurring between movement
onset and offset, were then extracted. Modifications of mean
velocity in correspondence to changes of demonstrator’s velocity
are usually considered proof of the occurrence of motion
contagion.
Statistics
Twomixed-design repeated measures ANOVAs were carried out
on average and peak velocity with condition (control, visuomotor
priming) as within-subject factor and dolphin identity (S., L.) as
between-subjects factor, to control for possible inter-individual
differences. The strength and direction of the linear relationship
between average and peak velocity exhibited by dolphins ‘‘A’’
and their models for the visuomotor priming condition was
determined by means of a correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r).
In particular, we correlated the average and peak velocity of
each trial of dolphin ‘‘A’’ to the just-observed movement of the
model.
Results
Statistical analyses revealed a significant effect of condition for
both average (F(1,4) = 8.67, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.68) and peak
(F(1,4) = 7.94, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.67) velocity. Dolphins were
consistently faster after the visuomotor priming than for the
control condition (Table 1). Notably, the interaction condition×
dolphin identity was not significant (p > 0.05), suggesting
that the priming influenced the motor performance for both
dolphins. Motor contagion effects were confirmed by the high
level of correlation between ‘‘A’’ dolphins and their models in
terms of both average and peak velocity (Table 1; see Figure 3 for
a representative session).
Discussion
Collectively, these findings provide definite evidence that
dolphins considered in this study showed visuomotor priming
effects, which might be due directly to activation by movement
observation of motor representations coding topographically
similar responses. These findings, therefore, offer the first
convincing evidence that a non-primate species, the bottlenose
dolphin, is capable of unintentional imitation.
Our study reveals interesting similarities between the way
dolphins and humans respond to action observation. It suggests
that action observation activates processes involved in action
execution.
Synchronous behavior exhibited by many dolphin species
are classical examples of on-line motor mimicry (Connor et al.,
2000; Bauer and Harley, 2001). Rather our results, based on a
postponed facilitation effect, suggest a representational system
that encodes information about other’s behaviors in the same
way it encodes information about one’s own behavior (Gopnik,
1993). These data fit well with theories assuming that the long-
term S-R associations mediating unintentional imitation are
TABLE 1 | Average and peak velocity (m/s) mean values recorded from the “A” and the “model” dolphins.
Average velocity (m/s) Peak velocity (m/s)
Session “A” Model r “A” Model r
Control Visuomotor priming Control Visuomotor priming
1 2.625 2.818 2.477 0.867* 8.062 8.781 8.409 0.941*
2 3.024 3.095 3.258 0.945* 6.345 7.071 9.740 0.879*
3 2.006 2.105 2.919 0.964** 7.387 8.062 9.662 0.983**
4 3.064 3.156 3.427 0.823 8.592 9.220 9.120 0.856
5 2.029 2.117 3.372 0.970** 8.902 9.220 12.042 0.858*
6 2.283 2.415 2.689 0.837 5.924 6.325 9.487 0.845
Pearson’s r indicate the correlation between each trial of dolphin “A” and the just-observed model movement. Asterisks indicate statistical significance (*p < 0.05;
**p < 0.01).
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FIGURE 3 | Trial by trial average velocity (m/s) recorded from the
model (upper panel, A) and “A” (lower panel, B) dolphins during a
representative session (Day 1). (C) Linear relationship between average
velocity exhibited by dolphins “A” and model for the visuomotor priming
condition at Day 1.
products of learning (Heyes et al., 2005; Prinz, 2005; Catmur
et al., 2009; Massen and Prinz, 2009). In this view, we cautiously
suggest that motor representations activated following action
observation might reflect an automatic resonance mechanism of
motor structures paralleling observed movements. This would
imply that the emergence of mirror-like manifestations are
not a by-product of factors specific to primates, but instead
might be attributable to general processes of associative learning
fostered by a high degree of encephalization and cognitive
ability. At the same time, the present results cannot exclude
a speculative interpretation of unintentional imitation in non-
primate species. Mirror neurons fire when monkeys perform
an action, but also when the animal observe somebody else
performing the same action (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al.,
2001). Following this discovery, studies have provided some
evidence that similar bimodal cells also exist in the human
brain (Mukamel et al., 2010). Here, findings from our study
might indicate the presence of a similar mirror mechanism in
dolphins too.
In conclusion, we suggest that even when dolphins do not
intend to imitate, the perception of action might activate the
same neural (mirror neurons or mirror areas) or representational
(common codes, shared representations or vertical associations)
structures that are involved in the production of the perceived
action. This might entail that in dolphins, rather than being
distantly related by rules, the perception and the execution
of action depend on the same systems, and the potential (or
impulse) to produce an imitative action is generated not just
when they intend to imitate, but whenever they watch another
dolphin’s behavior.
To date, hypotheses about the evolution of unintentional
imitation effects, as defined here, have largely confined on
primates. Our findings show a striking case of convergence in the
face of profound differences in neuroanatomical characteristics
and evolutionary history. We are aware that the issue of
whether the unintentional imitation effects exhibited by dolphins
rely on similar mechanisms as primates remains partially
unanswered, but this approach is promising and will shed new
light in the debate on the ‘‘intentional’’ nature of imitative
ability.
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